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DIVERSITY ENTITLEMENT:
DOES DIVERSITY-BENEFITS IDEOLOGY
UNDERMINE INCLUSION?
Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut
ABSTRACT—Ideologies are most successful (or most dangerous) when they
become common sense—when they become widely accepted, taken-forgranted truths—because these truths subsequently provide implicit
guidelines and expectations about what is moral, legitimate, and necessary
in our society. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Court,
without a majority opinion, considered and dismissed all but one of several
“common-sense” rationales for affirmative action in admissions. While
eschewing rationales that focused on addressing discrimination and
underrepresentation, the Court found that allowing all students to obtain the
educational benefits that flow from diversity was a compelling rationale—
essential, even, for a quality education. Although ostensibly pro-diversity,
this rationale positioned diversity as conditional on the educational benefit
to the student body as a whole, including white students. Armed with social
science evidence, subsequent affirmative action jurisprudence in Grutter and
Fisher reinforced this rationale. While these cases proved favorable to
affirmative action, the reasoning surrounding the benefits of diversity may
prove deleterious to inclusion efforts in the long run.
In this Essay, we first review the intellectual history of “diversitybenefits” ideology in these key affirmative action cases, focusing on the
recruitment of social science by litigants, amici, and the Court. We focus on
how these legal actors have used social science to construct a view of
diversity as a benefit to all, including dominant groups. In contrast, we note
that the impact of discrimination and lack of diversity on historically
marginalized groups has been largely, though not entirely, absent from this
social science literature. We then examine the interracial contact framework
that pervades the diversity-benefits literature, arguing that this approach is
psychologically one-sided in that it focuses more on the benefits Whites
receive from diversity than on how nondominant groups experience
diversity. Moreover, because diversity-benefits ideology positions Whites as
key beneficiaries, it could create a sense of entitlement to diversity. We
explain that while it appeals to egalitarian sensibilities, it can simultaneously
appeal to Whites’ psychological desires to maintain their position at the top
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of the social hierarchy. Finally, we discuss an experiment we conducted to
examine how four rationales based on those in Bakke affect policy support.
Preliminary results suggest that diversity-benefits language may lead Whites
to support policies that center benefits to white students more than policies
tailored for nondominant racial groups. Furthermore, the study provides
initial support for the role that egalitarianism and preference for racial
hierarchy together can play in cultivating a common-sense entitlement to
diversity.
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INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, the authors of this Essay learned of a white student at a
large university who expressed his disappointment that his classes lacked
African American students. What made this student’s stance stand out was
not that he had noticed the drastic underrepresentation of African American
students or even his dismay, but rather his explanation: that he had paid for
and expected the diversity that an education at this particular institution had
promised.
On the one hand, this response may seem surprising to those who
recognize that students don’t actually pay for, nor are they entitled to,
exposure to peers of a certain race. On the other hand, if viewed through the
prism of diversity ideology, the student’s sentiment is common sense.
Ideologies are most successful (or most dangerous) when they become
common sense—when they become widely accepted, taken-for-granted
truths—because these truths subsequently provide implicit guidelines and
expectations about what is moral, legitimate, and even necessary in our
society. In this case, the student’s sentiment comports with the “common
sense” constructed over several decades by Supreme Court rulings on
affirmative action, institutions of higher learning enacting diversity policies,
and social sciences insisting that diversity is a benefit that enriches the
education of all students, and sometimes even especially white students. The
student’s statement also reflects how people often experience diversity along
the dimensions of race and ethnicity; moreover, the focus on African
Americans reflects the common association between the concept of diversity
and certain racial groups.1
We are certainly not the first to draw attention to the commodification
of racial identity2 or the critique of the diversity rationale for affirmative

1
See, e.g., Joyce M. Bell & Douglas Hartmann, Diversity in Everyday Discourse: The Cultural
Ambiguities and Consequences of “Happy Talk”, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 895, 903–05 (2007) (finding in a
four-city study of diversity discourse that “respondents typically define diversity in broad and inclusive
terms, but when asked to describe personal experiences with difference, their responses are almost
exclusively tied to race”). For a review, see Victoria C. Plaut et al., New Frontiers in Diversity Research:
Conceptions of Diversity and Their Theoretical and Practical Implications, in 1 APA HANDBOOK OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION 593 (Mario Mikulincer
& Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2015); Miguel Unzueta & Kevin R. Binning, Which Racial Groups Are
Associated with Diversity?, 16 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 443, 445 (2010)
(finding that African Americans and Latinos are most commonly associated with diversity).
2
See, e.g., Bell & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 909 (finding that respondents, and perhaps especially
white respondents, understand the benefits of diversity through the lens of cultural consumption and
expanded choice and from a white normative center, and highlighting the way in which diversity
discourse frames people of color as contributors “to the enrichment of a presumably neutral ‘us’”); Nancy
Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013).
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action on the basis that it appears to benefit white students.3 Professor Nancy
Leong, for example, has identified a system of racial capitalism, which is
spurred in part by affirmative action doctrine, whereby non-Whites are used
for their social and economic value.4 Additionally, Professor Daria
Roithmayr has argued that the decision in the affirmative action case Grutter
v. Bollinger “privileges white interests,”5 in part because it “focuses on the
value” brought by students of color to the classroom.6
Our project uses this previous work as a point of departure and asks
what the law and psychology together can tell us about the development of
the intuition informing the student’s expectation of diversity in education—
what we call the “common sense” entitlement to diversity, or diversity
entitlement. In the first part of the Essay, we summarize affirmative action
jurisprudence that has promoted a diversity-benefits rationale for the use of
race in admissions while eschewing others that acknowledge racial
inequality and open the door to remediating discrimination. We turn our lens
to social science, uncovering how psychology itself has helped to nourish
diversity-benefits ideology. We examine how psychological research has
been enshrined in attorneys’ arguments, expert testimony of psychologists
and other scholars, and amicus briefs submitted by social scientists,
including psychologists. At the same time, we acknowledge that social
science has also offered up plenty of empirical justification for the very
rationales that the Court has systematically dismissed.
In the second part of the Essay, we dive into the psychological and
related literatures to describe more fully the burgeoning research that
identifies the benefits of diversity and to explain the hegemonic assumptions
that have prevailed in this work, namely that contact between groups is
experienced in the same way by people of different groups. We stipulate that
an analysis is needed of the ways in which ideologies about diversity reflect
certain expectations about who will benefit from diversity. We then theorize
the psychological mechanisms that animate the diversity entitlement
expressed by historically privileged groups (e.g., Whites) who believe they
are egalitarian, but still harbor a desire for hierarchy.
In the third part of the Essay, we present a study that represents an initial
attempt to empirically capture the effect of diversity-benefits ideology on

3

See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191
(2004); David Kow, The (Un)compelling Interest for Underrepresented Minority Students: Enhancing
the Education of White Students Underexposed to Racial Diversity, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 157
(2010).
4
Leong, supra note 2, at 2153–55.
5
Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 194.
6
Id. at 211.
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inclusion-related policy support. We suggest that this preliminary study
demonstrates that diversity-benefits ideology can undermine inclusion.
Our Essay illuminates how social science and the Court’s use of that
social science contributes to certain ideological understandings of diversity.
Of course, the Court has not always been friendly to social science. For
example, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court discounted empirical evidence of
racial bias in the criminal justice system.7 In this Essay we examine social
science that the Court has weighed more heavily, specifically in its rationale
for affirmative action.8 This research—on the benefits of diversity in higher
education—differs from that in McCleskey in that it does not focus on
discrimination at all. But, as we conclude, the Court’s elevation of a
diversity-benefits rationale over remedially focused ones is itself
symptomatic of the retreat from addressing discrimination and “a fear of too
much justice” that plague opinions such as McCleskey.9
I.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE

In this Part, we trace an intellectual history of the nature of the diversitybenefits ideology in key affirmative action cases in higher education—
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher—in an effort to excavate the Court’s vision of
diversity and how social science helped construct this vision. Of particular
interest to us here are the ways in which social science has figured into
advocates’ legal strategy, appeared in the Court’s reasoning about the
purpose of diversity, or represented and perpetuated particular narratives
about diversity through amicus briefs.

7
481 U.S. 279 (1987). For example, the Court argued that empirical evidence presented by Professor
David Baldus showing racial disparities was “insufficient to support an inference that . . .
decisionmakers . . . acted with discriminatory purpose,” id. at 297, and suggested that it “[a]t most . . .
indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race,” id. at 312. For further discussion of the Court’s
use of social science evidence in McCleskey, see Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, “Playing It
Safe” with Empirical Evidence: Selective Use of Social Science in Supreme Court Cases About Racial
Justice and Marriage Equality, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1570–72 (2018).
8
For example, see discussion of the use of social science in Grutter in Section I.C., infra.
9
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court’s slippery slope argument in
McCleskey involved a concern that, should McCleskey prevail, discrimination claims would surface for
other punishments, and any number of minority groups could claim discrimination. Id. at 315–16 (Powell,
J., opinion of the Court). It bears noting that Justice Lewis Powell, who had previously penned a key
affirmative action opinion, Bakke, discussed infra Section I.A., cited that opinion’s notion of a “nation of
minorities” in making the slippery slope argument: “[i]n [Bakke], we recognized that the national
‘majority’ ‘is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior
discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.’” 481 U.S. at 316 n.39. Pointing to the
“fear of too much justice” across affirmative action, criminal justice, and marriage equality cases,
Robinson and Frost highlight “the Court’s preference for affirming civil rights only when doing so will
not dismantle entrenched social hierarchies.” Robinson & Frost, supra note 7, at 1569.
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A. Bakke
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell
considered and dismissed all but one of several common-sense rationales for
using a racial classification in admissions.10 In his opinion stating the
judgment of the Court, Powell entertained the following purposes advanced
by the university: 1) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession”; 2) “countering
the effects of societal discrimination”; 3) “increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved”; and 4)
“obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse
student body.”11 In a footnote, Powell also entertained a fifth purpose not
advanced by the university: the “fair appraisal of each individual’s academic
promise in the light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures.”12
Interpreting the purpose of addressing historical underrepresentation of
people of color in the field as a preferential scheme, Powell rejected the first
rationale on the basis that it was “discrimination for its own sake” and
constitutionally forbidden.13 Although he saw a legitimate interest in
remediating discrimination, Powell rejected the second rationale as well on
the basis that there had been no “findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.”14 Further, he described societal discrimination as “an amorphous
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”15 Powell
found the third rationale, facilitating health care in underserved
communities, to be compelling, but he argued that the university had not
proved that racial preference was required to achieve this goal.16 Regarding
the fifth rationale, the one identified by Powell himself, he pointed out that
the university had not suggested that its quantitative admissions metrics were
biased or that the affirmative action program was designed to address such
bias.17
Powell did, however, find the attainment of a diverse student body to
be a compelling rationale18—essential, even, for a quality education.19 And
although each other rationale was ostensibly pro-diversity, only this one

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
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438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., opinion announcing the judgment of the Court).
Id. at 306 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 306 n.43.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 307–09 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 306 n.43.
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 312.
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positioned diversity as conditional on the educational benefit to the student
body as a whole, presumably including the white students who comprised
the majority of the student body. Powell’s argument rested on the notion that
a diverse student body promoted an “atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment
and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education” and that “the
‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”20 The
diversity rationale appeared to be premised on the value that students of
certain backgrounds would bring to the education of the rest of the student
body: “An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular
background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or
disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences,
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body . . . .”21
Quoting language from the Harvard College Admissions Program appended
to the amicus brief authored by Harvard and other universities and to his
opinion, Powell suggested, quite explicitly, that certain students offered
something to the college that others could not: “A farm boy from Idaho can
bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly,
a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot
offer . . . .”22 Further, the Harvard program directly linked educational
quality with the presence of these different backgrounds, asserting that “[t]he
quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College
depends in part on these differences in the background and outlook that
students bring with them.”23
The amicus brief, authored by Columbia University, Harvard
University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, went
even further in its explicit characterization of diversity as serving the
interests of white students:
A policy of increasing the number of students from minority groups is, in our
judgment, the best choice for all of our students because it is the best way to
achieve a diverse student body. A primary value of liberal education should be
exposure to new and provocative points of view, at a time in the student’s life
when he or she has recently left home and is eager for new intellectual

20

Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 314.
22
Id. at 316, app. at 323; Brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University
and the University of Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae app. at *2, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811),
1977 WL 188007.
23
Brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University and the University of
Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae app. at *2, supra note 22.
21

1611

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
experiences. Minority students add such points of view, both in the classroom
and in the larger university community.24

This excerpt implies that the role of students of color in the university setting
is to enrich the educational experience of the sheltered white student. Indeed,
the brief asserted that “the purpose [of the special treatment of minorities in
university admissions] is not only or even primarily to confer benefits upon
members of minorities” but includes improving “the quality of teaching and
learning for majority” students.25
Fifty-seven amicus briefs were submitted in Bakke, of which forty-one
were in support of the university.26 To our knowledge these did not include
any briefs of social scientists per se; however, social science does appear in
the arguments of amici curiae. For example, the amicus brief of the American
Association of University Professors specifically argued that the entire class,
and indeed society as a whole, benefits from student diversity.27 Grounding
their argument in sociological work, they claimed that this benefit is gained
in part by “bringing the rather special experiences of members of otherwise
significantly under-represented groups to bear in the give-and-take of class
discussion and other collaborative academic work.”28 Once again, the
introduction of historically underrepresented groups for the sake of
improving educational quality for others lay at the heart of the argument for
the benefits of diversity.
B. Grutter
Social science, and psychology in particular, figure more prominently
in Grutter v. Bollinger.29 In Grutter, the Court once again relied on the
diversity rationale to uphold the use of race in university admissions.30
Specifically, it reasserted diversity as a compelling interest in finding the
University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program—in which race

24

Id. at *12–13.
Id. at *27. Similarly, the brief states: “By our admissions programs, we are not merely contributing
to the cause of increasing the numbers of minority leaders and public servants-although of course we wish
very much to do that. We are also broadening the perceptions of our majority students, and we believe
that this will be reflected in qualities that they will retain for the rest of their lives.” Id. at *14.
26
William Claiborne, 577 Law Briefs on Bakke, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 1977),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/09/17/57-law-briefs-on-bakke/b3cb7c7c-b70e4008-adc1-964886cbd552 [https://perma.cc/UJH6-UF8H].
27
Brief of the American Association of University Professors, Amicus Curiae, at *2, *14, Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 188010.
28
Id. at *7.
29
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
30
Id. at 327–33.
25
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comprised one of many factors—to be constitutional.31 Writing for the
majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor referenced amicus briefs from the
military and from corporations to support the claim that diversity serves a
“real” benefit.32 But she also relied on social science findings regarding
diversity benefits:
The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its
amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at
trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning
outcomes, and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”33

The bulk of this research suggests the benefits of diversity for improved
racial understanding and cross-racial interaction, democratic citizenship and
civic engagement, active and complex thinking, academic engagement and
motivation, and intellectual and academic skills.34
In fact, as the case made its way to the Supreme Court, the university
itself relied heavily on this social science research, including research from
one of its experts, psychologist and University of Michigan professor
Patricia Gurin. Professor Gurin’s report detailed analyses from three large
higher education datasets, one from the University of Michigan and others
from universities around the country.35 Specifically, the university referenced
her findings that experiencing racial and ethnic diversity in the classroom
and in informal interactions was beneficial to students’ educational
outcomes: “students who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in
classroom settings and in informal interactions with other students showed
the greatest engagement in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual
engagement and motivation, and improvement in a range of academic and
intellectual skills.”36 Notably, in prefacing Gurin’s research, the university
argued that “expert testimony submitted by the Law School in this case

31

Id.
Id. at 330–31.
33
Id. at 330 (citing Brief of the American Educational Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, THE
SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001); COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE
EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003)).
34
For research cited by Justice O’Connor, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
35
Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin at 3–5, Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D.
Mich. 2005) (No. 97-75231) [hereinafter Gurin Report].
36
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928).
32
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provides unrebut[t]ed empirical proof for the common sense judgment that
racial and ethnic diversity improves education.”37
In addition to Professor Gurin’s report, the university also collected
expert reports focusing on past discrimination and the effects of stereotypes
on the performance of underrepresented groups. One of these reports, by
historian Albert Camarillo, detailed the history of discrimination against
Latinos in the United States and its long-term effects, including deficits in
educational, employment, and housing opportunities.38 However, the
university used Professor Camarillo’s report to set the context of segregation
patterns—it argued, based on the report, for the necessity of bringing people
of different groups together in higher education. It did not use the report to
make an argument about the discrimination itself.39 Similarly, Professor
Thomas Sugrue outlined the persistence of residential, educational, and
socioeconomic color lines (and their discriminatory roots) and argued that
“deep divisions” between racial groups “are a consequence of a troubled and
still unresolved past.”40 He used these divisions to highlight the persistence
of stereotypes that limit access to opportunity for African Americans,
Latinos, and American Indians, and the continued lack of understanding
between groups. Yet, the university focused primarily on the issues of
intergroup contact and misperceptions in Sugrue’s report.41 Psychologist
Claude Steele’s report testified to the influence of negative stereotypes on
the performance of African American students;42 however, this contribution
does not appear in the university’s motion for summary judgment in district
court.43
In contrast, the student defendant-intervenors in Grutter and its
companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, relied on social science experts in
portraying the discrimination and hostile racial climate faced by
underrepresented students,44 perhaps because they felt less constrained to do

37

Id.
Expert Report of Albert M. Camarillo, Gratz, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (No. 97-75231).
39
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 13. The university similarly used
the expert testimony of Professor Eric Foner on historical patterns of racial subordination to discuss
present-day segregation. Id.
40
Expert Witness Report of Thomas J. Sugrue at 67, Gratz, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (No. 97-75231).
41
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 13.
42
Report of Expert Testimony of Claude M. Steele, Gratz, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (No. 97-75231)
[hereinafter Steele Report].
43
The university cited the Steele report in a footnote, but only with respect to the general relationship
between test scores and grades. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 19 n.11.
44
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al. at 43, 46, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 716302; Brief for the Patterson Respondents at 13–15, Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 367216.
38
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so than the university.45 For example, Professor Walter Allen, who testified
at trial in Grutter, and his colleague, Professor Daniel Solórzano, submitted
an expert report on behalf of the student intervenors in Grutter and Gratz.
The report detailed the results of a multi-method study on racial climate at
the University of Michigan Law School and four of its feeder schools and
found “persistent, extensive, debilitating discrimination against women and
students of color” and that these groups “experience these campuses as
hostile environments, places where they are either not welcome or are
welcome only in clearly delimited, subordinate status.”46 The student
intervenors’ brief in Grutter also cites Claude Steele’s expert report and
deposition as well as the burgeoning literature on stereotype threat.47 The
student brief used Allen and Steele’s testimony to argue that “grades do not
have the same meaning across race.”48
The University of Michigan received a substantial amount of support in
the form of approximately 83 out of 102 amicus briefs submitted in Grutter
and Gratz.49 Several of these were from organizations focusing on social
science or education research. The American Psychological Association
(APA) brief recognized the structural effects of discrimination and its
implications for the opportunities available to students of color.50 It also
suggested that although explicit bias may have waned, unconscious bias
remains and may further limit opportunities for people of color and the
effectiveness of diverse workgroups.51 In addition, the APA suggested that
diversity “promotes harmonious and productive intergroup relations.”52 A
significant portion of the brief was devoted to reiterating53 and defending the
45
Brief for the Patterson Respondents at 3, supra note 44 (“For understandable reasons, the
University is reluctant to acknowledge that history, but Intervenors (whom Plaintiffs ignore in their
presentation to this Court) have placed it in the record and argue its significance in this Brief.” (footnote
omitted)).
46
Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solórzano, Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and Campus Racial
Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 237, 301
(2001).
47
Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., supra note 44, at 43 & n. 29 (arguing that stereotype
threat “depresses minority students’ performance on tests thought to measure intellectual ability” and
their “general academic performance”). Stereotype threat is the fear of being “judged or treated in terms
of [a negative] stereotype, or that one could inadvertently do something that would confirm [the
stereotype].” Steele Report, supra note 42, at 7.
48
Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., supra note 44, at 46.
49
Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 366 (2003).
50
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents at 5,
11, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516),
2003 WL 398321.
51
Id. at 5–6.
52
Id. at 4.
53
Id. at 15–19.
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main findings of Professor Gurin’s research on the educational benefits of
diversity and supporting its methodology.54 A brief from the American
Educational Research Association, cited by Justice O’Connor, focused
squarely on the Gurin Report and the educational benefits of diversity.55 The
brief of the American Sociological Association focused on residential and
school segregation, economic disadvantage, and stigma and their impacts on
unequal access to resources.56 Notably, the brief used this context to argue
for the importance of diversity in higher education. For example, it stated
that “[e]ach student has the potential to enhance the educational experience
for others, and universities have a compelling interest in identifying
applicants who will contribute the most to that mix.”57 Taken together, even
though two of the amicus briefs focused to a certain extent on discrimination
and structural inequalities, the educational benefits of diversity remained the
underlying theme of these briefs.
C. Fisher
In the Fisher v. University of Texas cases, the Court continued to rely
on the notion of “educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity,”58 and ultimately ruled a University of Texas race-conscious
admissions program constitutional.59 Ninety-two amicus briefs were
submitted in Fisher I, including seventy-three in support of the University of
Texas, and nearly that number in Fisher II. About a half-dozen briefs were
submitted on behalf of groups of social scientists (e.g., “823 Social
Scientists,” “American Social Science Researchers,” “Empirical Scholars,”
“Experimental Psychologists,” and “Social and Organizational
Psychologists”), and professional associations such as the American
Psychological Association and the American Education Research
Association.60 Because these social science briefs were fairly similar across

54
Id. at 18–19 (defending Gurin’s research from the critiques made in the Brief from the National
Association of Scholars).
55
Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398292.
56
Brief of the American Sociological Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398313.
57
Id. at 21.
58
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2010 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]; Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 309 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I].
59
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2202.
60
In full disclosure, one of the authors was directly involved in two of these briefs. Victoria Plaut
acted as a contributor to and signatory in the amicus brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists and
as a contributor to the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological Association.

1616

112:1605 (2018)

Diversity Entitlement

the two cases, we discuss them interchangeably, except where relevant.61 By
our count, in total, over 1,300 social scientists signed on to these briefs. A
number of other briefs also presented social science research, including, for
example, those submitted by the National Education Association, the
Harvard Graduate School of Education Students for Diversity, the National
Black Law Students Association, and the Black Student Alliance at the
University of Texas at Austin.62
The social science briefs capture pre- and post-Grutter literature which
continues the diversity-benefits thread from Grutter, arguing that diversity
brings “increased cross-racial interaction among students, reduced prejudice,
improved cognitive abilities, critical thinking skills and self-confidence,
greater civic engagement, and improved leadership and workplace skills.”63
But these briefs also represent a shift in focus compared to the social science
briefs in Grutter. While most of the social science briefs—as in Grutter—
cited evidence for the benefits of diversity to all students, including to
nonminority students, the briefs in the Fisher cases highlighted a wider range
of benefits, including the mitigating effects of diversity on racial isolation,
stereotype threat, social identity threat, and feelings of tokenism, as well as
the ameliorating effects on social belonging.64
61

Of the seven groups mentioned here, five submitted amicus briefs in both cases, and one submitted
a brief in Fisher I and then submitted a brief from an expanded and renamed group in Fisher II (the 444
social scientists represented in the Brief of American Social Science Researchers became “823 Social
Scientists”).
62
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Harvard Graduate School of Education Students for Diversity in
Support of Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3308201.
63
Liliana M. Garces, The Legal Context and Social Science Evidence in Fisher v. University of
Texas, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL EQUITY: CONSIDERING THE FISHER CASE TO FORGE THE
PATH AHEAD 3, 11 (Uma M. Jayakumar et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015).
64
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6735840 (describing the effects
of stereotype threat on cognitive performance, well-being, and persistence, and how stereotype threat can
be reduced by increasing representation of underrepresented groups, thus mitigating racial isolation and
the likelihood of underrepresented students being perceived as tokens); Brief of Experimental
Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981),
2015 WL 6774020 (providing an overview of the effects of stereotype threat on performance and
psychological well-being, as well as how the experience of racial isolation and tokenism amplifies the
effect of stereotype threat on underrepresented groups); Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6774561
(detailing in one section of the brief how campus diversity can reduce racial isolation and solo status and
thereby lessen the effects of stereotype threat and increase feelings of social belonging); Brief of 823
Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981),
2015 WL 6754975 (highlighting the importance of creating an academic environment that fosters social
belonging in order to lessen the effects of racial isolation and tokenism); Brief of Amicus Curiae the
American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11345), 2012 WL 3527855 (same as in Fisher II brief); Brief of American Social Science Researchers as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No.11-345), 2012 WL 3308200
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For example, the amicus brief of experimental psychologists argued
that “[s]tereotype threat in college depresses the performance of many
minority students”65 and “because of the phenomenon of stereotype threat, a
college will have to take race into account if it wishes to admit the best
students and to ensure that all students perform as well as they are capable.”66
It further argued that “efforts to reduce stereotype threat” required
“remedy[ing] the experience of racial isolation and tokenism that renews and
amplifies stereotype threat” and that it was therefore “important to
complement these strategies with mechanisms to promote diversity in
college classes.”67 The amicus brief of 823 social scientists cited research on
underrepresented students’ perceptions of racial climate, experiences of
discrimination and stereotyping, and belonging on university campuses.68
Another example is the amicus brief of social and organizational
psychologists: in addition to discussing diversity-benefits research, this brief
also focused on diversity’s ability to reduce the harms of racial isolation and
stereotype threat, as well as the importance of institutional-belonging signals
for underrepresented students.69 By highlighting these topics, the briefs
explicitly addressed ways in which a lack of diversity and other harmful
features of the environment were experienced by and impacted historically
marginalized groups.
This dual approach may signal an enduring tension, expressed in
jurisprudence and bolstered by research in social psychology and related
fields, over where the focus of diversity impact should lie when adjudicating
affirmative action cases.70 The tension between focusing on the impact of a
lack of diversity on historically marginalized groups and focusing on the
ways in which diversity benefits historically privileged groups in particular
may present unique challenges to inclusion and inclusive practices.71 In the
(highlighting the importance of diversity in lessening the effects of stereotype threat and the subsequent
positive effects this can have on underrepresented students’ performance; also arguing that diversity
decreases racial isolation by providing more than a “token” presence in classrooms); Brief of
Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11345), 2012 WL 3540405 (same as in Fisher II brief); Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3308291 (same
as in Fisher II brief).
65
Brief of Experimental Psychologists, supra note 64, at 25.
66
Id. at 31.
67
Id.
68
Brief of 823 Social Scientists, supra note 64, at 35–38.
69
Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists, supra note 64 at 9–17.
70
For scholarship on the cost and distraction of focusing on diversity, see, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson,
Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 592–98 (2009); Derrick Bell, Diversity’s
Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003).
71
Scholars have also highlighted that “diversity,” especially as conceptualized by Whites, typically
omits issues of power and inequality, Bell & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 905–907, and has shifted focus
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next section, we explore more deeply the social psychological research that
nourishes this tension and uncover psychological mechanisms that may
animate a diversity entitlement that leads people to choose one focus over
another.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY ENTITLEMENT
Social science offers insight into the complicated set of processes that
undergird the supremacy the diversity rationale has enjoyed in affirmative
action jurisprudence. Further, psychological research specifically can
uncover ways in which the rationale may actually serve to foster a sense of
entitlement to diversity that adversely impacts inclusive efforts. This Part
discusses the foundations of individual psychological orientations that allow
the diversity rationale a psychological platform to cultivate diversity
entitlement. To do this, we first survey the literature that demonstrates the
psychological benefits dominant group members can derive from diversity—
literature that was used to bolster the diversity rationale’s use in affirmative
action jurisprudence. We then turn to the psychological literature on
diversity ideologies, or shared understandings about how to approach
diversity. Here we discuss how diversity benefits, when examined through
an ideological lens, may have psychological consequences that
psychological research has yet to fully investigate. Finally, we discuss two
psychological orientations that may animate mechanisms operating within
the diversity-benefits ideology to facilitate an entitlement to diversity and
harm inclusion in higher education. This examination of the psychological
underpinnings of diversity-benefits ideology gives us insight into the
influence it may have on the psychological experience and institutional
practices of inclusion in higher education.
A. Diversity Benefits in Psychological Research
Social psychological research, along with research in other social
sciences, catalogues a robust set of physiological, psychological, and
interpersonal benefits derived from diversity. Diversity, this research
suggests, can ease racial anxiety and threat. Interactions among people from
different identity groups (e.g., racial, gender, or sexual-orientation groups)

away from “discrimination, injustice, and historical disenfranchisement” in organizations, Lauren B.
Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,
106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1632 (2001). For an examination of the shift from the legal to business case for
diversity in organizations, see also Jamillah Bowman Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates
vs. Corporate Interests, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1473, 1480–87 (2017).
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are plagued by anxiety, stress, and tension.72 This tension manifests not only
psychologically,73 but also physiologically in cardiovascular reactivity,
increased cortisol production, and changes in heart rate and breathing.74
Research shows that experience with diverse groups of people can improve
physiological regulation of cardiovascular threat responses to someone of a
stigmatized race,75 result in faster cessation of cortisol production,76 and
result in faster return to regular heart rate.77 The physiological regulation
resulting from increased interracial contact facilitates long-term
cardiovascular health.78 Benefits of diversity, according to this literature,
also extend to prejudice reduction. For example, studies examining the
effects of interracial roommate assignments in college generally find
improved racial attitudes.79
In addition to improved physiological reactions, lower anxiety levels,
and prejudice reduction, social science research demonstrates that interracial
contact improves cognitive processing,80 critical thinking,81 and problemsolving.82 Comparing racially homogeneous and racially heterogeneous
discussion groups, one study showed that the presence of racial minorities
increased the complexity with which students—especially students from the
racial majority—approach a given issue.83 Members from homogeneous
72
Jim Blascovich et al., Perceiver Threat in Social Interactions with Stigmatized Others, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 253, 266 (2001).
73
Jennifer A. Richeson, Sophie Trawalter & J. Nicole Shelton, African Americans’ Implicit Racial
Attitudes and the Depletion of Executive Function After Interracial Interactions, 23 SOC. COGNITION 336,
337 (2005).
74
Blascovich et al., supra note 72, at 266; Elizabeth Page-Gould et al., Intergroup Contact
Facilitates Physiological Recovery Following Stressful Intergroup Interactions, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 854, 856 (2010).
75
Blascovich et al., supra note 72, at 266.
76
Page-Gould et al., supra note 74, at 857.
77
Id. at 854–56.
78
Id.
79
Natalie J. Shook & Russell H. Fazio, Interracial Roommate Relationships: An Experimental Field
Test of the Contact Hypothesis, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 717, 721 (2008); Colette Van Laar et al., The Effect of
University Roommate Contact on Ethnic Attitudes and Behavior, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
329, 329 (2005).
80
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 604–05
(2006); Samuel R. Sommers, Lindsey S. Warp & Corrine C. Mahoney, Cognitive Effects of Racial
Diversity: White Individuals’ Information Processing in Heterogeneous Groups, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1129, 1129 (2008).
81
Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College
Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 507, 509 (2004).
82
Nida Denson & Shirley Zhang, The Impact of Student Experiences with Diversity on Developing
Graduate Attributes, 35 STUD. HIGHER EDUC. 529, 529 (2010).
83
Antonio et al., supra note 81, at 509.
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groups exhibited no such cognitive stimulation.84 Some research suggests
that interracial contact fosters such improved critical thinking not just
because of what racial minorities have to say, but because of how Whites
cognitively categorize them. In other words, when people of different races
engage each other, they often are confronted with surprising attributes or
opinions that challenge existing stereotypes. Processing these unexpected
category combinations requires deeper and more creative thinking than
simply relying on preconceived stereotypes.85
Prejudice has long been a central concern of social psychological
research.86 Given the sordid history of racial and other types of oppression
in the United States, it comes as no surprise that research demonstrates
persisting anxiety, tension, prejudice, and stereotypes that plague intergroup
interactions. Social psychology has also developed a large body of literature
devoted to fostering harmonious intergroup relations, primarily through the
reduction of prejudice, characterized as antipathy towards other groups. In
fact, social psychology’s investment in mitigating negative feelings about
historically oppressed groups through prejudice reduction represents a
substantial portion of research on diversity benefits.87 Dixon and colleagues,
in their research on prejudice-reduction models of social change,
characterize the phenomenon nicely when they say: “If negative evaluation
of the disadvantaged is defined as the problem, then the emotional and
cognitive rehabilitation of the advantaged becomes the solution.”88
Researchers prioritized intergroup contact, particularly interracial
contact, as a primary means of reducing prejudice. Indeed, a meta-analysis
of over 515 studies found that contact between racial and ethnic groups
reduces prejudice.89 Moreover, interracial interaction appears to reduce
implicit and explicit prejudices in the development of interpersonal
relationships. One meta-analysis of eighty-one studies spanning forty years
of research found that, initially, participants engaging in interracial
interactions report more negative emotions (e.g., anxiety) than participants

84

Id.
Richard J. Crisp & Rhiannon N. Turner, Cognitive Adaptation to the Experience of Social and
Cultural Diversity, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 242, 242 (2011).
86
See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
87
Id.; Rupert Brown & Miles Hewstone, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact, in 37
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 258 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005); Thomas F.
Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 751 (2006).
88
John Dixon et al., Beyond Prejudice: Are Negative Evaluations the Problem and Is Getting Us to
Like One Another More the Solution?, 35 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 411, 417 (2012).
89
Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 87, at 751.
85
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in same-race interactions.90 However, over time, repeated interracial
interactions produced more positive emotional experiences. 91 The
aforementioned research on college roommates also suggests benefits of
interracial contact. In one study, racial attitudes of white students randomly
assigned to room with a black student became more positive toward black
people, whereas the racial attitudes of white students in same-race roommate
assignments did not change.92 Whites in interracial rooms also reported
decreased intergroup anxiety toward black people.93 In another study, both
when roommate assignments were random and when they were voluntary,
interracial assignments tended to decrease prejudice (with some
exceptions).94
The literature on diversity benefits highlights the myriad benefits of
interracial contact. However, the prejudice-reduction framework that
pervades this literature asserts a hegemony of psychological experience in
intergroup contact—a portrayal of contact that is psychologically one-sided
and primarily focused on Whites. In other words, by focusing primarily on
remediating the negative feelings of the historically oppressive group, it
assumes that historically oppressed groups experience contact in the same
way as their counterparts. Additionally, although it is reasonable to assume
that prejudice reduction has indirect benefits for the historical targets of
prejudice, the focus of this approach is on the direct benefits to Whites. In
sum, the outcomes and the psychological experiences of interracial contact
are often portrayed as uniformly positive and equitable for all racial groups.
The potential consequence of this portrayal is an ideological belief about
diversity that positions the psychologically hegemonic benefits of interracial
contact as supreme.
What is the other side of the psychological story? Do people similarly
experience and benefit from interracial encounters? Some research suggests
that students benefit differentially from interactional diversity depending on
their backgrounds. In one study, compared with students of color, white
students benefited more in critical thinking development from exposure to

90
Negin R. Toosi et al., Dyadic Interracial Interactions: A Meta-Analysis, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1,
7, 12 (2012).
91
Id. at 20.
92
Shook & Fazio, supra note 79, at 721.
93
Id.
94
Van Laar et al., supra note 79, at 329. Researchers found several exceptions for contact with Asian
American roommates. Whether randomly assigned or voluntary, contact with Asian Americans tended to
make attitudes towards other groups more negative. Id. at 339. Furthermore, exposure to white roommates
also increased symbolic racism among black respondents, and decreased Latinx students’ sense of
competence interacting with students of other ethnicities. Id. at 337–38.
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people from diverse backgrounds.95 Similarly, another study found that white
students generally had larger gains from their diversity experiences than did
students of color on many outcome measures, including general education,
science and technology, and diversity competence.96 Meta-analytic research
examining the relationship between greater contact and decreased prejudice
also finds a stronger relationship for “majority status” groups than for
“minority status” groups.97 A closer look at the roommate literature also calls
into question whether the benefits of contact extend equally across groups.98
And even the pivotal research by Patricia Gurin used in Grutter suggests
potentially differential effects of diversity for different groups. For example,
for African American students, some of the benefits of diversity derived not
from other-race interaction but from same-race interaction and friendships.99
The affirmative action jurisprudence, which relies on the diversity
rationale, takes for granted that there are benefits to diverse contact.
However, the aforementioned research suggests that we should be asking
whether certain groups (e.g., Whites) may benefit more than others from
interracial contact. Perhaps a diversity-benefits ideology acts as a façade but
is not actually the reality, or at least not the whole picture, as it relates to
diversity and inclusion. In addition, could a diversity-benefits ideology that
positions students with marginalized identities (e.g., students of color) as
vehicles for dominant (e.g., Whites) students’ growth, as opposed to equally
positioned students poised to learn, undermine inclusion? Could it even
create a sense of entitlement to diversity among white students?
B. Diversity Ideology
Existing research on diversity ideologies,100 across a variety of fields,
excavates the influence these ideologies have in undermining or fostering

95
Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Do Diversity Experiences Influence the Development of Critical
Thinking?, 42 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 257, 264–68 (2001).
96
Shouping Hu & George D. Kuh, Diversity Experiences and College Student Learning and
Personal Development, 44 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 320, 329 (2003).
97
See Linda R. Tropp & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and
Prejudice Among Minority and Majority Status Groups, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 951, 954 (2005).
98
See Van Laar et al., supra note 79, at 329.
99
Gurin Report, supra note 35, at 37.
100
Diversity ideologies, or models of diversity, are “shared understandings and practices of how
groups come together or should come together, relate to one another, and include and accommodate one
another in light of the differences associated with group identity.” Victoria C. Plaut, Cultural Models of
Diversity in America: The Psychology of Difference and Inclusion, in ENGAGING CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 365, 368 (Richard
Shweder, Martha Minow & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 2002).

1623

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

inclusion.101 Much of the diversity-ideologies literature within psychology
has pitted identity-blindness (e.g., colorblindness) against identityconsciousness (e.g., multiculturalism), though their definitions vary.102
Generally, colorblindness minimizes the use and significance of racial
identity and suggests that race should not and does not matter.103 According
to multiculturalism, group membership matters and should be
acknowledged, respected, and even valued.104 Each ideology includes a set
of normative beliefs that serves as a framework for institutional policies and
practices and assumptions about how people should interact in diverse
settings. The ideological orientations that people have toward diversity have
real consequences and exert real influence on inclusion and inclusive
practices.
Reviews of this literature suggest that identity-conscious ideologies
such as multiculturalism have mixed outcomes for inclusion, while
colorblindness has somewhat, but not exclusively, negative outcomes.105 For
example, colorblindness as a well-intentioned interaction strategy on the part
of Whites can backfire in interracial interactions.106 It can also be used to
justify current inequality.107 For instance, in one study, when threatened,

101
See generally, e.g., Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The Structure of Racism in Color-Blind, “PostRacial” America, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1358 (2015) (arguing that the racial ideology of colorblindness is used as a more civil way of maintaining white racial dominance through a facially nonracial
mechanism—making inequality more difficult to address); Angélica S. Gutiérrez & Miguel M. Unzueta,
The Effect of Interethnic Ideologies on the Likability of Stereotypic vs. Counterstereotypic Minority
Targets, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 775 (2010) (finding that interethnic ideologies (e.g.,
multiculturalism vs. colorblindness) have different effects on the perceived likability of a man of color to
the extent that he either conforms to stereotypical caricatures of his group or is counter-stereotypic); Ian
F. Haney-López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010) (arguing that colorblind ideology contributes to the mass incarceration
epidemic); Eric D. Knowles et al., On the Malleability of Ideology: Motivated Construals of Color
Blindness, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (2009) (arguing that individuals’ intergroup
motivations to maintain or undermine the status quo can shift their construal of colorblindness); Valerie
Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for
African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (finding
that diversity ideologies work in tandem with cues regarding organizational demographics to signal to
underrepresented groups how they may be treated within an organization).
102
See Plaut et al., supra note 1, for a review.
103
Id. at 604–06.
104
Id. at 600–04
105
Victoria C. Plaut et al., Do Color Blindness and Multiculturalism Remedy or Foster
Discrimination and Racism?, CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., May 14, 2018, at 1.
106
Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Seeing Race and Seeming Racist?
Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness in Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918,
922 (2008).
107
See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 25–53 (4th ed. 2014); Tamar Saguy, John F. Dovidio
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Whites who preferred group-based hierarchy used colorblindness to defend
the status quo.108 Conversely, multiculturalism has been shown to have
positive implications for interracial interaction, engagement, and inclusion.
In one large field study, employees of color working in departments where
white peers hold more multicultural attitudes (e.g., supporting organizational
diversity) felt more psychologically engaged and perceived less bias.109
Among college students, exposure to a multicultural university statement
(stressing strength in and embracing diversity) led to better performance for
women of color than a colorblind statement (stressing similarity and that
race, ethnicity, gender, and religion are immaterial).110 Relatedly,
organizational diversity policies that stress differences (rather than
similarities) foster leadership self-perceptions and goals among minorities.111
However, multiculturalism is by no means a silver bullet among the
arsenal of ideological approaches. Research suggests a variety of negative
implications of multiculturalism—or an emphasis on valuing diversity—
when portrayed in a particular way or under certain circumstances.
Multiculturalism can be harmful if it leads to pigeonholing—placing people
into limited socially conscribed roles where they are valued mostly for their
social identity.112 In one study, researchers examined the effects of priming
multiculturalism (vs. colorblindness) on how likable white participants
perceived a man of color who displayed stereotype-consistent or inconsistent
extracurricular interests (e.g., a Latino who likes Salsa vs. Hip-Hop).113
When exposed to multiculturalism, participants liked the stereotypical target
more than the counterstereotypic target, suggesting that multiculturalism
constrains racial and ethnic minorities’ identity expression.114 Thus, while
multiculturalism is an ostensibly pro-diversity ideology, research observes
negative effects for inclusion. It is possible then that pro-diversity/egalitarian
ideological approaches can still undermine inclusion.

& Felicia Pratto, Beyond Contact: Intergroup Contact in the Context of Power Relations,
34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 432, 442–44 (2008).
108
Knowles et al., supra note 101, at 860.
109
Victoria C. Plaut, Kecia M. Thomas & Matt J. Goren, Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness
Better for Minorities?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI . 444, 444–45 (2009).
110
Leigh S. Wilton et al., Communicating More than Diversity: The Effect of Institutional Diversity
Statements on Expectations and Performance as a Function of Race and Gender, 21 CULTURAL
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 315, 315 (2015).
111
Seval Gündemir et al., The Impact of Organizational Diversity Policies on Minority Employees’
Leadership Self-Perceptions and Goals, 24 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 172, 172 (2017).
112
See Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001).
113
Gutiérrez & Unzueta, supra note 101.
114
Id. at 777–79.
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The literature on diversity ideologies provides insight into the role
ideologies play in inclusion practices. The research explicitly examines the
beliefs operating within these ideologies about how people are supposed to
relate to one another. It does not, however, examine expectations about who
is supposed to benefit when they do. Here we attempt to identify a
consequence of a diversity-benefits ideology normalized in social
psychological research: diversity entitlement. Why might an ideology that
can facilitate entitlement enjoy such ubiquity in modern jurisprudence,
organizations, and culture? We argue that the explicit hegemonic belief that
diversity benefits everyone, while ostensibly pro-diversity and appealing to
egalitarian sensibilities, belies very real racial differences in the way people
psychologically experience interracial contact. As such, we hypothesize that
an ideology that minimizes that reality may fall prey to and facilitate a
psychological expectation or entitlement among dominant groups to the
benefits enumerated within the literature.
C. Modern Egalitarianism
Values, or the commonly accepted standards of the goal-directed
behaviors of human existence, shape people’s attitudes toward different
groups in society.115 A common American value orientation is
egalitarianism116—an adherence to democratic ideals of equality.117
Considering the conception of prejudice as a negative orientation towards
another group, and the proliferation of intergroup contact as the primary
antidote for such antipathy, intergroup contact, diversity, and intergroup
harmony appeal to self-identified egalitarians. Prior research has
documented various correlates of egalitarianism. For example, egalitarians
report lower levels of prejudice, greater political liberalism, and greater
support for redistributive policies such as social welfare and affirmative
action.118
Although egalitarianism can have positive implications for intergroup
relations, egalitarianism can be a double-edged sword. First, egalitarianism
115

See, e.g., Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict:
Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
893, 894 (1988).
116
See generally JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’
VIEWS OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE (1986); HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH,
LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS
(rev. ed. 1997).
117
Katz & Hass, supra note 115.
118
Arnold K. Ho et al., The Nature of Social Dominance Orientation: Theorizing and Measuring
Preferences for Intergroup Inequality Using the New SDO7 Scale, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1003, 1021 (2015).
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does not exist in a psychological vacuum. Research suggests that in the
absence of strong antidiscrimination norms, or when they have a race-neutral
justification for doing so, people with an egalitarian self-image may still
discriminate.119 Indeed, a large literature on “aversive racism” suggests
possessing an egalitarian self-image can coexist with implicit negative
attitudes towards disadvantaged groups.120 These implicit biases can have
deleterious implications for intergroup dynamics,121 racial minorities’
educational achievement,122 and juror decision-making,123 just to name a few.
In other words, racially disparate outcomes can persist despite explicit claims
of egalitarianism expressed by the perpetrators of bias. Egalitarianism may
mask individuals’ conscious awareness of implicit biases that they may hold.
Thus, egalitarians can often be blissfully unaware of the ways in which they
contribute to and perpetuate discrimination.
Secondly, egalitarianism can serve ego-protective functions that
preclude achieving professed egalitarian goals. Research demonstrates that
being part of a group commonly associated with racism (e.g., Whites)
threatens the group members’ identity as individuals and as part of the
broader racial group.124 This threat may represent a fear that they will be
perceived as prejudiced, or an understanding that they are part of a morally
suspect group and their successes are not fully earned due to historical
privileges.125 Because of these threats, maintaining or displaying an
egalitarian self-concept may serve important psychologically protective
functions for Whites. They might, for example, be motivated to demonstrate
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their nonprejudiced attitudes126 or even attempt to “dismantle” their privilege
by supporting inclusive policies.127 However, doing so may not necessarily
subvert the existing hierarchy, but rather may help to maintain an appearance
of rejecting the hierarchy. While this egalitarian approach acknowledges
marginalized groups’ disadvantage, it focuses on Whites’ ego needs and
feelings as opposed to harms experienced by disadvantaged groups—thus
leaving their psychological place in the social hierarchy untouched. This
focus on protecting the ego as opposed to actually subverting racial
hierarchies maintains the status quo by focusing on Whites’ feelings as
opposed to mitigating marginalized groups’ disadvantage.
White egalitarians who experience a threat against their identity and
feel the need to manage their egalitarian self-concept may find diversitybenefits ideology especially appealing. Endorsing the diversity-benefits
ideology may mitigate the psychological threat white egalitarians
experience, because it allows them to “dismantle” systems of privilege
(symbolically) by endorsing an ostensibly pro-diversity belief. It deflects the
perception that they might be prejudiced and it helps them distance
themselves from a morally suspect group. Moreover, reinforcing an
egalitarian self-concept also allows one to feel “morally credentialed.”128 In
other words, embracing diversity-benefits ideology may actually have the
pernicious effect of making someone feel like they are egalitarian even if
their behavior creates outcomes that are not. People who endorse diversitybenefits ideology may genuinely believe it to be a culturally appropriate,
sensitive, and egalitarian approach toward diversity, but they might be
insulated from explicitly understanding the ways in which diversity-benefits
ideology also reinforces the status quo. As we discuss in the next section,
egalitarianism may also insulate Whites from recognizing their own desire
for occupying the top of the hierarchy and reaping the benefits that status
confers.
D. Dominance, Hierarchy, and Diversity Entitlement
Social Dominance Theory postulates that societies are organized into
group-based hierarchies in which the distribution of limited resources favors
dominant groups at the expense of subordinated groups.129 As such, dominant
126
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Shelton & Jennifer A. Richeson, To Be Liked Versus Respected: Divergent Goals in Interracial
Interactions, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 248, 261 (2010).
127
Knowles et al., supra note 124, at 602–03.
128
See Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 34 (2001).
129
JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL
HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 31–32 (1999).

1628

112:1605 (2018)

Diversity Entitlement

groups derive psychological and material benefits from the privileges they
receive in the social hierarchy. This benefit gives dominant groups the
psychological motive to maintain the status quo—a social dominance
orientation (SDO). Prior research documents attitudes that correlate with
SDO. For example, those high in SDO report higher levels of prejudice,
greater political conservatism, and decreased support for redistributive
policies such as social welfare and affirmative action.130
The theory also postulates that the hierarchical organization of societies
results from processes, such as individuals’ decisions and behavior, sociocultural practices, and institutional actions. Each of these processes is shaped
by legitimizing myths—or consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs,
stereotypes, and cultural ideologies.131 These myths can be hierarchyenhancing, organizing society in ways that sustain dominant group
hierarchy, or hierarchy-attenuating, countering group-based dominance.132
For example, racism, meritocracy, and sexism are all hierarchy-legitimizing
myths. Conversely, egalitarianism is a hierarchy-attenuating myth. The force
of these myths in bolstering the hierarchy is largely propelled by their
consensus across groups.133 That is, the more widely accepted these myths,
the more impactful they are at maintaining or attenuating the hierarchy.
Diversity-benefits ideology may serve as a legitimizing myth operating
in legal reasoning and social scientific practices to maintain White
dominance. This hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth may be particularly
pernicious because it is facially egalitarian and appeals to widely held beliefs
about the value of diversity. Diversity-benefits ideology encompasses a
belief in the hegemonic benefits of diversity. That is, the ideology professes
a uniformly equitable experience of diversity for different groups. As
mentioned earlier, this appeals to egalitarianism—a consensual value in
American society. Yet the ideology actually positions white students as key
beneficiaries of diversity, mimicking existing hierarchies where Whites are
on top. Thus, for Whites who possess a strong orientation toward social
130
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dominance, diversity-benefits ideology may not only appeal to their
dominant desires, but because of its egalitarian façade, may also nurture an
expectation they may not consciously know is there.
Egalitarianism and social dominance seem orthogonal with respect to
their implications for inclusion. After all, people high in SDO tend to
disfavor redistributive policies whereas egalitarians usually favor them.134
How can such disparate ideals be represented within a person? Moreover,
how can these ideas operate in tandem to negatively influence inclusive
policy support? As discussed earlier, egalitarianism can coexist with
seemingly disparate biases. Further, SDO may not only manifest explicitly.
Although no studies have examined implicit forms of SDO, implicit bias
research and research on social dominance can together provide us with the
tools to make an informed hypothesis about how implicit orientations
towards social dominance may foster an entitlement towards the perceived
benefits of diversity to the detriment of inclusion.
E. A Psychological Cocktail
Research in social psychology treats egalitarianism and social
dominance as psychologically dissonant.135 However, these constructs may
coalesce in ways that are integral to the way people interpret diversitybenefits ideology and succumb to diversity entitlement. Diversity-benefits
ideology appeals to egalitarian sensibilities, but the uninterrogated, implicit
understanding within the ideology (that Whites are the primary beneficiaries
of diversity) may appeal to implicit social dominance sensibilities. Though
there is some work to suggest that desire for hierarchy can operate at
unconscious levels,136 this has not been rigorously investigated. Our future
work will begin to construct measures of implicit social dominance.
Presently, however, our preliminary empirical work discussed in the next
Part begins unpacking the role explicit preferences for group-based
dominance and egalitarianism play in cultivating entitlement to diversity.
This study explores a conservative test of our hypothesis by examining the
relationship between egalitarianism and explicit SDO and support of
inclusive policies.
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III. DIVERSITY RATIONALES AND INCLUSION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
A. Overview
We conducted a study as a first step toward examining the effects of
diversity-benefits ideology on inclusion.137 In this preliminary study, we
were interested in testing the effects of exposing white people to a diversitybenefits ideology modeled after the Court’s diversity rationale. We were
particularly interested in examining these effects among white people who
thought of themselves as egalitarian but also expressed a desire to preserve
the racial hierarchy. We predicted that when egalitarian Whites who were
also high in social dominance viewed a diversity-benefits rationale for
diversity, they would express less support for policies that emphasize the
inclusion needs of historically marginalized groups (e.g., black students)
compared to policies that emphasize the inclusion needs of historically
privileged groups (e.g., white students). Four hundred and fifteen Amazon
Mechanical Turk workers138 participated in the study, of whom 289 were
white, 203 were women, and 104 were students currently enrolled in a
university.
B. Procedure
The study instructed the participants to role-play being a program
officer for a foundation that gives money to universities to help fund their
diversity initiatives. In this position, they viewed policies that different
universities from across the country planned to implement. We informed
them that the name of each university had been removed for blind
assessment.139 They were instructed to evaluate policies by assigning points
to each one. Further, we mentioned that the foundation would use their point
allocations and general policy ratings to make final funding decisions.
Participants were given a total of 100 points to allocate between all six
policies. As part of the study, participants were randomly assigned to view
one of four rationales for pursuing diversity before they began their task.
Each condition represented a rationale considered in Bakke—reducing
historic underrepresentation, redressing societal discrimination, benefiting
minority communities, and diversity benefits. For example, participants in
137
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the diversity-benefits condition saw the following statement: “One reason
often given for pursuing these initiatives is that all students benefit from the
experiences and perspectives that a diverse student body can provide.”
After viewing their respective rationale, participants then saw six
policies that represented two different policy categories. Three policies,
which we label “isolation-focused,” centered on mitigating underrepresented
group members’ sense of isolation and solo status. The other three policies,
which we label “benefit-focused,” centered on increasing the benefits of
diversity by “equally distributing” students from underrepresented groups.
Policies within each category were matched. For example, one benefitfocused policy instructed departments at the university to adopt mandatory
study groups for first-year students that reflected the diversity of the firstyear class and to “evenly distribute factors such as gender and ethnicity/race,
enabling students to learn from one another.” The corresponding isolationfocused policy also instructed departments at the university to adopt
mandatory study groups for the first-year students but to structure the groups
such that “no student from a traditionally underrepresented group is isolated
as the only member of their gender and/or ethnicity/race,” meaning some
pods would contain clusters of underrepresented students and others might
not. Participants gave each policy points, then rated how much they
supported each policy and how effective they believed each policy to be.
C. Measures
Participants completed a sixteen-item measure of SDO.140 The scale has
two subdimensions: SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) which constitutes support
for the active maintenance of oppressive hierarchies in which high-status
groups dominate and control the prerogatives of low-status groups, and
SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E) which constitutes support for group equality
and equal opportunity. We used responses to this scale to identify
participants low and high in both dominance and egalitarianism. We
interacted these subdimensions to explore how dominance and
egalitarianism moderated the relationship between diversity-benefits
ideology and support for inclusive policies. Participants also answered
questions about their diversity-benefit expectations, such as “I have a right
to benefit from diversity,” and “My racial group should have the opportunity
to benefit from diversity.” Additionally, participants answered open-ended
questions pertaining to why they believed in the pursuit of diversity, and
whom they thought diversity policy should most serve. Answers to these
open-ended questions were coded.
140
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D. Preliminary Results
We found promising preliminary support for our hypotheses.
Participants exposed to the diversity-benefits rationale supported benefitfocused policies over isolation-focused policies with marginally significant
differences. This preference was moderated by egalitarianism (i.e., SDO-E)
and dominance (i.e., SDO-D). That is, participants who reported high levels
of egalitarianism and high levels of dominance particularly supported
benefit-focused policies over isolation-focused policies. Moreover, the
responses to our open-ended questions proved to be very rich. A large
number of participants cited reasons for pursuing diversity that emphasized
diversity benefits (e.g., prejudice reduction, learning outcomes). A much
smaller but discernible set of participants cited more redistributive reasons
for pursuing diversity (e.g., access to opportunity, redressing historical
injustice). In response to the question “who should diversity policy most
serve,” those participants who cited more benefit-related reasons for
pursuing diversity overwhelmingly mentioned that diversity policy should
serve majority students as well. Conversely, participants who cited more
redistributive reasons for pursuing diversity more often mentioned that
diversity policy should serve minority student needs primarily. Notably,
nearly all of the aforementioned participants supported diversity policy
generally and saw diversity as something universities (and they themselves)
should pursue. That is, nearly all of the participants were self-professed
egalitarians, yet a divide in who the primary beneficiary of a perceived
resource should be persisted. That divide corresponded to differences in
endorsement of diversity-benefits ideology.
These data provide preliminary evidence for the sense of entitlement
that diversity-benefits ideology can yield. Independent of condition,
participants who freely prioritized diversity benefits were more likely to feel
that diversity should most serve dominant group members in addition to
nondominant group members. Further, when certain policies centered the
needs of minorities, participants in the diversity-benefits condition rated
those policies less favorably than policies that centered the benefits to
dominant groups. Taken together, these data provide preliminary evidence
for entitlement to diversity among majority groups who endorse diversitybenefits ideology.
E. Implications for Inclusion
This study is among the first to examine the joint operation of
egalitarianism and dominance in determining policy support. The normative
claim here is not that diversity is bad or that wanting diversity is harmful.
Rather, the focus on diversity benefits espoused in law may be constituted
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by and contribute to psychological processes that actually undermine
inclusion by cultivating a sense of entitlement among dominant (e.g., white)
groups. The diversity rationale facilitates a diversity-benefits ideology that
appeals to egalitarianism and dominance sensibilities such that it feels good,
does not upset the status quo, and precludes policy makers from adopting
institutional policies that may be better situated to insulate historically
unrepresented students from the harms associated with being
underrepresented.
Although the study does not measure implicit dominance, it provides
initial support for the role dominance and egalitarianism together can play in
cultivating an entitlement to diversity. The diversity-benefits ideology,
though appealing, leads Whites to prioritize diversity policies that benefit
them over diversity policies more directly tailored for racial minorities. The
opportunity to benefit may lead those with a strong orientation toward social
dominance to prefer policies that, while still pro-diversity, may not be as
effective in addressing the particular inclusion needs of racial minorities.
This approach toward inclusive policy may prove harmful to the
achievement, well-being, and retention of racial minorities in the long run.
Future research will examine these implications in greater depth.
CONCLUSION
In our Introduction, we mentioned a white student who expressed
disappointment that his classes lacked African American students. The
remarkable aspect of his stance was his claim that he had paid for and
expected the diversity that an education at this particular institution had
promised. Unfortunately, the student’s entitlement fits squarely within the
ideological framework of the time—a framework constructed through the
decades-long interplay of Supreme Court rulings on affirmative action,
universities’ enactments of diversity policies, and social science data that has
emphasized the benefits diversity provided to the education of all students,
and sometimes especially white students. However, when one further
unpacks the student’s reasoning, what stands out about his stance is not just
his entitlement to diversity, but that in possessing this entitlement, his
imagination for what diversity could look like in educational spaces was
limited. He did not lobby the university administration to increase the overall
number of African American admissions; nor did he attempt to imagine
alternative modes of engaging in intergroup contact. Rather, he sought to
configure the educational space in a way that served his own perceived
needs.
The student’s educational imagination is not the only one truncated by
a diversity-benefits ideology. While the numerous benefits of diversity
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articulated by social science research are important, the focus on diversity’s
benefit to white students interacts with people’s psychological desires to
maintain the status quo that can ultimately cultivate an entitlement to
diversity. When law sanctions that entitlement by positioning these benefits
as necessary for the use of corrective strategies to achieve diversity in higher
education, the court’s imagination surrounding diversity in education is also
limited. The preliminary research discussed in this Essay begins to
demonstrate that this entitlement and subsequent conception of the
educational setting can have potentially negative consequences for inclusion,
particularly for racial minorities. Moreover, it suggests that the elevation of
a diversity-benefits rationale relative to others may not only stem from but
also entrench “a fear of too much justice”141 and constrain efforts to address
discrimination.
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